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SETOFFS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT'S JUDGMENT
CREDITORS AS COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIMS
(OR, THE ARTFUL ADVOCATE REWARDED)*
THROUGH skillful procedural maneuvering, the compulsory counterclaim
rule of the Court of Claims-rule 17(a)-can be played off against the statute
permitting the United States to withhold alleged setoffs from its judgment
creditors. In substance, rule 17(a) requires the Government to plead "any
claim which at the time of serving . . . [its] answer the . . . [Government]
has against any plaintiff, if ... [the claim] arises out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the [plaintiff's] petition . . "' The
setoff statute, on the other hand, authorizes the Comptroller General of the
United States to withhold from a judgment creditor any amounts which the
Government asserts are owed it by the creditor.2 Should a creditor object to
*United States v. Eastport S.S. Corp., 255 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1958), affirning 142
F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
1. Compulsory Counterclaims: The answer shall state as a counterclaim any claim
which at the time of serving the answer the defendant has against any plaintiff,
if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
petition and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of
whom the Court cannot acquire jurisdiction, except that such a claim need not be
so stated if at the time the action was commenced the claim was the subject of
another pending action, and except that in any case, where the hearing in the first
instance is limited to the issues of fact and law relating to the right of plaintiff
to recover, defendant may plead such a counterclaim within 60 days after the Court
shall have rendered judgment determining that plaintiff has a right to recover.
CT. CL. R. 17(a). The Court of Claims had no compulsory counterclaim rule prior to
1953, when the court's rules were generally revised. Rule 17(a) was derived from rule
13(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws 2645,
2646 (1951).
2. Offsets against judgments against United States. When any final judgment re-
covered against the United States duly allowed by legal authority shall be pre-
sented to the Comptroller General of the United States for payment, and the
plaintiff therein shall be indebted to the United States in any manner, whether
as principal or surety, it shall be the duty of the Comptroller General of the United
States to withhold payment of an amount of such judgment equal to the debt thus
due to the United States; and if such plaintiff assents to such set-off, and dis-
charges his judgment or an amount thereof equal to said debt, the Comptroller
General of the United States shall execute a discharge of the debt due from the
plaintiff to the United States. But if such plaintiff denies his indebtedness to the
United States, or refuses to consent to the set-off, then the Comptroller General
uf the United States shall withhold payment of such further amount of such judg-
ment as in his opinion will be sufficient to cover all legal charges and costs in
prosecuting the debt of the United States to final judgment. And if such debt is
not already in suit, it shall be the duty of the Comptroller General of the United
States to cause legal proceedings to be immediately commenced to enforce the
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a withholding, the statute directs the Comptroller to cause suit to be com-
menced promptly in order that the disputed government claim be reduced to
judgment. If the Government loses such a lawsuit, it must pay the creditor
same, and to cause the same to be prosecuted to final judgment with all reasonable
dispatch. And if in such action judgment shall be rendered against the United
States, or the amount recovered for debt and costs shall be less than the amount
so withheld as before provided, the balance shall then be paid over to such plain-
tiff by such Comptroller General of the United States with 6 per centum interest
thereon for the time it has been withheld from the plaintiff.
18 Stat. 481 (1875), as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 227 (1952).
Equity has long recognized analogous proceedings for restraining the collection of a
judgment when the judgment creditor is possibly insolvent and unable to pay a claim
against him by the judgment debtor. North Chicago Rolling Mill Co. v. St. Louis Ore
& Steel Co., 152 U.S. 596, 616 (1894). Although in practice the Comptroller withholds
government claims only when the judgment creditor's solvency is questionable, it has
been suggested that the withholding is required in every case. See Whelan, A Govern-
ment Contractor's Remedies; Claims and Counterclaims, 42 VA. L. REv. 301, 306 (1956).
The Comptroller acts in a ministerial capacity in settling claims based on judgments;
and courts have stated that he cannot go behind a judgment into the merits of a claim
and refuse to pay. See, e.g., Hines v. United States ex rel. Marsh, 105 F.2d 85 (D.C.
Cir. 1939) ; Foster, The General Accounting Office and Government Clains (pts. 1-3),
16 J.B.A.D.C. 193, 275, 321 (1949). Even without the setoff statute, the United States
has the conventional creditor's right to apply moneys of his debtor in hand to extinguish
debts due from a debtor who is also a nonjudgment creditor. United States v. Munsey
Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234 (1947) ; Barry v. United States, 229 U.S. 47 (1913). The Gov-
ernment may also set off erroneous overpayments on previous claims against a later
claim by an overpaid claimant. See, e.g., 22 DEcs. Comp. GEN. 952 (1943). But such
revision of prior settlements is restricted by a one-year statute of limitations. 28 Stat.
207 (1894), as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 74 (1952), Kruszewski v. United States, 163 F.2d
884 (7th Cir. 1947) (alternative holding), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 880 (1948). In con-
trast, the General Accounting Office has not allowed a private debtor to set off a debt
allegedly owed him by the Government. 30 Dacs. Comp. GEN. 105 (1950).
In order to facilitate the withholding of setoffs, the General Accounting Office main-
tains a record of a large number of debts owed the United States. Foster, supra at 326.
In 1956, the GAO had 160,000 such claims on file; in 1957, 1.14,363. 1956 Comp. GEN.
ANN. REP. 6-7; 1957 id. at 284. In 1957, $1,357,097 were collected by the process of set-
off. Ibid.
3. The Comptroller's duty to sue is mandatory and not discretionary. National Bulk
Carriers, Inc. v. Warren, 82 F. Supp. 511 (D.D.C. 1949) (dictum). For the judgment
creditor's power to bring mandamus when the Comptroller delays suit on a withholding,
see note 42 infra. The provision for suit should a judgment creditor object to a setoff
is vital to the validity of the act. Otherwise, the re-examination and revision of judg-
ments by an administrative officer would raise constitutional questions. See United States
v. O'Grady, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 641 (1874). Not the administrative determination that
a setoff exists but the consent of the judgment creditor, or, when he protests, the subse-
quent adjudication, allows the Government to reduce a judgment presented for payment.
Hines v. United States ex rel. Marsh, 105 F.2d 85, 89 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Bonnafon v.
United States, 14 Ct. Cl. 484, 491 (1878). The Comptroller's suit is required even when
the Government's claim has been recognized by lawful though nonjudicial authority.
Hines v. United States, supra.
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interest on the withheld sum, as well as the sum itself.4 Adroit creditors can,
however, seize upon rule 17(a) to shortcut these statutory provisions through
tactics revealed in recent litigation.5
In the 1954 case of Eastport Steamship Corp. v. United States, the Court
of Claims awarded the petitioning company a $54,097 judgment.0 When East-
port presented this judgment to the Comptroller General, he paid it in part
but withheld $31,102, which represented an unrelated government admiralty
claim against Eastport.7 Disregarding the procedure specified in the setoff
statute, Eastport declined to await suit by the Government and, eight days
after the withholding, commenced a new action in the Court of Claims to
recover the unpaid portion of its original judgment.8 Thirty-two days later,
the United States, pursuant to the setoff law, sued on its admiralty claim in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
9
In its second action before the Court of Claims, Eastport denied indebted-
ness to the United States for the withheld $31,102, asserted that the with-
holding was wrongful, and demanded payment of six per cent interest as
authorized by the setoff statute.10 The United States moved to dismiss East-
port's action on the grounds that it raised issues cognizable only in admiral-
ty, was intended to frustrate the settlement procedure of the setoff statute,
4. Interest at 6% is allowed from the time of withholding if judgment is rendered
against the Government, or if the amount the Government recovers by suit is less than
the amount withheld. American Potash Co. v. United States, 80 Ct. Cl. 160, 8 F. Supp.
717 (1934) (dictum). Interest at 4% is authorized from the date of the filing of the
transcript of the judgment to the date of the mandate of affirmance, should the Supreme
Court affirm a judgment against the United States on government petition for review.
28 U.S.C. § 2516(b) (1952).
In other contexts, the United States is not ordinarily liable for interest on claims
against it. 28 U.S.C. § 2516 (1952) ; see, e.g., United States v. Goltra, 312 U.S. 203
(1941); United States v. Commonwealth & Dominion Line, Ltd., 278 U.S. 427 (1929).
5. Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 128 Ct. Cl. 778 (1954) (original judgment) ;
131 Ct. Cl. 210, 130 F. Supp. 333 (1955) (denial of government motion to dismiss action
on judgment); 135 Ct. Cl. 175, 140 F. Supp. 773 (1956) (Eastport's motion to strike
government answer granted); United States v. Eastport S.S. Corp., 142 F. Supp. 375
(S.D.N.Y. 1956) (Eastport's motion to dismiss granted), aff'd, 255 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.
1958).
6. 128 Ct. Cl. 778 (1954). Eastport purchased a steamship from the United States
in 1948 under a contract of sale which provided that the amount paid by Eastport was
to be reduced by an amount equal to the cost of repairs necessary to enable Eastport to
register the vessel. The action and judgment for $54,097 followed the Government's al-
leged refusal to reimburse Eastport for such costs. 255 F.2d at 797.
7. The basis of the Government's claim was a lease of government vessels to East-
port. According to the Government, Eastport owed $109,126 additional charter hire of
which it had paid only $78,024. Ibid.
8. Id. at 806.
9. Eastport conceded that the Government's complaint was filed "with uncommon
, eed." 'Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p. 14, Eastport
S.S. Corp. v. United States, 131 Ct. Cl. 210, 130 F. Supp. 333 (1955).
10. Eastport's Petition in the Court of Claims, Oct. 7, 1954.
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and would deprive the United States of control over its own claim." The
court denied this motion. In so doing, it held that the setoff statute does not
provide an exclusive procedure for adjudicating disputed sums which the
Comptroller withholds.' 2
The United States, preferring to prosecute its own action in the district
court 13 and finding Eastport to be solvent,14 then returned the withheld
money and, after some hesitation, also confessed judgment for the six per
cent interest demanded by Eastport.' 5 Meanwhile, back in the district court,
Eastport had called attention to its second action in the Court of Claims and
moved to dismiss the Government's admiralty complaint.'6 The company had
asserted that, under rule 17(a), the government action should now be barred
because it rested on a compulsory counterclaim to Eastport's suit for interest
in the Court of Claims.17 Both the district court and the Second Circuit sus-
11. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a Claim
Upon Which Relief May Be Granted, Oct. 29, 1954.
12. 131 Ct. Cl. 210, 130 F. Supp. 333 (1955).
13. The United States hoped to avoid adverse precedent in the Court of Claims.
Prior to Sword Line, Inc. v. United States, 351 U.S. 976 (1956), afijrmnig per curiam
228 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1955), 230 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1956)-which held this type of claim,
see note 7 supra, to sound exclusively in admiralty and not to fall within the Court of
Claims' jurisdiction-the Court of Claims had asserted jurisdiction over several cases
involving the same issues. And the Court of Claims, in a pair of now-stranded cases,
had resolved these issues against the Government. A. H. Bull S.S. Co. v. United States,
123 Ct. Cl. 520, 528, 108 F. Supp. 95, 99 (1952) ; Southeastern Oil Fla., Inc. v. United
States, 127 Ct. Cl. 409, 414, 119 F. Supp. 731, 734 (1933). The United States hoped to
prevail in the federal district courts and to avoid these Court of Claims precedents
which would, after Sw'ord Line, come to life only if a government counterclaim raised
the issues. Compare Smith-Johnson S.S. Corp. v. United States, 135 Ct. Cl. 869, 139 F.
Supp. 298 (1956), with Smith-Johnson S.S. Corp. v. United States, 135 Ct. Cl. 866, 142
F. Supp. 367 (1956).
14. The Comptroller's right to withhold under the setoff statute is usually exercised
after protest by the creditor only if a question exists as to the judgment creditor's sol-
vency. Interviews with United States Attorneys, Nov. 1958; see Foster, supra note 2.
at 333. But see Whelan, supra note 2, at 306 (requiring withholding in every case).
15. Answer of the United States, July 1, 1955; Defendant's Answering Memran-
dum on Plaintiff's Motion to Strike, March 15, 1956.
16. 142 F. Supp. at 375.
17. Such a bar is of judicial origin and is not specifically required by statute. 3
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 13.12, at 27 (2d ed. 1948). Some writers justify the salic-
tion by grounding the compulsory counterclaim rule in principles of res judicata. Id.
1113.12; Scott Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARv. L. REV. 1, 26 (1942). Set:
also Switzer Bros. v. Locklin, 207 F.2d 483, 488 (7th Cir. 1953) ; Libbey-Owens-Ford
Glass Co. v. Sylvania Industrial Corp., 154 F.2d 814, 818 (2d Cir. 1946) (dissenting
opinion) ; Developments in the Lazt-Res Judicata, 65 1-IARv. L. REv. 818, 832 (1952).
This rationale implies that the counterclaim rule broadens the scope of the cause of
action determined by the judgment. Wright, Estoppel by Rule: The Compulsory Counter-
claim under Modern Pleading, 38 MINI. L. REV. 423, 428 (1954). This explanation has
been termed correct "only on the assumption that there is but one cause of action:
otherwise res judicata can have no application, and the relevant doctrine is that of cul-
lateral estoppel, which has not customarily applied to unlitigated issues." Id. at 42(.
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tained the motion to dismiss.18 These courts reasoned that, since the setoff
statute only authorized interest when a claim on which a withholding is based
proves groundless, and since the Government's district court claim therefore
raised the very issues of merit presented by Eastport's second action in the
Court of Claims,'0 Eastport's action for interest and the Government's ad-
miralty claim were "logically related." 20
The results reached by the Second Circuit and district court were not in-
escapable, for no clear policy required that rule 17(a), here construed for the
first time,21 be applied. Designed to prevent the relitigation of once-heard
facts,2 2 the rule seems inapposite in the instant case because Eastport's second
Court of Claims action never reached trial.23 Moreover, the wording "claim
which... arises out of the transaction or occurrence" 24 suggests that the rule
does not comprehend a counterclaim that matures prior to the cause forming
the basis of the complaint, nor situations in which the counterclaim pertains
to only one of a multiplicity of actionable events alleged in the complaint.
Under this commentator's approach, a compulsory counterclaim would not be barred if
the defendant had not knowingly refrained from asserting his claim, or if the previous
action had ended in a consent or default judgment concluded before the defendant had
actually waived his counterclaim. Ibid.
18. 142 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 255 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1958).
The district court should have denied the motion in view of the fact that the second
Court of Claims action was still pending. By the time the case reached the Second Cir-
cuit, the second Court of Claims action had been concluded and this issue rendered moot.
255 F.2d at 802 n.10.
19. "Thus, it may be seen that the United States' only hope of succeeding in that
suit lay in proving that plaintiff actually owed $31,102 under the bareboat charter." 142
F. Supp. at 376.
"In the present case, the failure of the Government's claim not only would have laid
a foundation for Eastport's claim; it would have established it. Conversely, the failure
of Eastport to establish its claim for interest would have established the Government's
claim for additional charter hire. The issues raised by the respective claims were iden-
tical." 255 F.2d at 805.
20. 142 F. Supp. 375, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 255 F.2d 795, 804 (2d Cir. 1958).
21. The only previous case involving rule 17(a) was limited to the rule's effect on
the statute of limitations. Canned Foods, Inc. v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 771 (Ct.
Cl.), vacated on rehearing, 135 Ct. Cl. 862, 146 F. Supp. 470 (1956).
22. Cf. Louisville Trust Co. v. Glenn, 66 F. Supp. 872, 874 (W.D. Ky. 1946); Gal-
lahar v. George A. Rheman Co., 50 F. Supp. 655, 661 (S.D. Ga. 1943) ; Schram v. Luck-
ing, 31 F. Supp. 749, 751 (E.D. Mich. 1940).
23. The United States paid the withheld balance of Eastport's judgment on April
28, 1955. Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 135 Ct. Cl. 175, 140 F. Supp. 773, 774
(1956). On October 15, 1956, the United States "confessed judgment" for the interest
claimed. Order No. 399-54, Ct. Cl. 1956.
No clear line of authority establishes whether the penalty for failure to assert a com-
pulsory counterclaim applies when the first action results in a consent or default judg-
ment. Wright, snpra note 17, at 430; cf. Douglas v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foun-
dation, 81 F. Supp. 167, 170 (N.D. Ill. 1948) (dictum) (no bar); Schott v. Colonial
Baking Co., 111 F. Supp. 13, 18 (W.D. Ark. 1953) (assuming no bar under federal
rules but justifying one under state law).
24. See note 1 supra.
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Both these factors characterized Eastport.2 5 On the other hand, identical lan-
guage in the district courts' compulsory counterclaim rule 2 6 has been held to
embrace claims which are "logically related to" the underlying "transaction
or occurrence." 27 Still, the "logically related" test has generally been utilized
only when jurisdiction could not be sustained over a counterclaim unless it
was treated as compulsory.28 And courts have been reluctant to invoke the
test to render a claimant remediless by barring the separate litigation of un-
heard claims. 29 The Second Circuit could well have exhibited a similar reluc-
tance in Eastport, especially in view of the fact that the Government's ad-
miralty claim would not have been considered a compulsory counterclaim to
Eastport's original Court of Claims suit.30
25. The Government's claim for charter hire arose under a lease entered into in 1947.
Approximately one year later, Eastport purchased the ship under the contract which was
the basis of its judgment in 1954. See note 6 supra. A contract of sale and repair in 1948,
the judgment in 1954, the appropriation for payment in 68 Stat. 827 (1954), the with-
holding by the Comptroller in 1954, and Eastport's rights to interest under the setoff
statute all made up the subject matter of Eastport's petition in its second Court of Claims
action. 255 F.2d at 797.
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
27. E.g., United Artists Corp. v. Masterpiece Productions Inc., 221 F.2d 213, 216
(2d Cir. 1955), reversing United Artists Corp. v. Grinieff, 15 F.R.D. 395 (S.D.N.Y.
1954); RFC v. First Nat'l Bank, 17 F.R.D. 397 (D. Wyo. 1955); Rosenthal v. Fowler,
12 F.R.D. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) ; cf. Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S.
593, 610 (1926).
28. E.g., Lesnik v. Public Industrials Corp., 144 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1944) ; Affiliated
Music Enterprises, Inc. v. Sesac, Inc., 17 F.R.D. 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); In the Matter
of Farrell Publishing Corp., 130 F. Supp. 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Douglas v. Wisconsin
Alumni Research Foundation, 81 F. Supp. 167 (N.D. Ill. 1948).
Federal courts need not have independent subject matter jurisdiction over compulsory
counterclaims so long as jurisdiction exists over the principal claim. But a court may
not hear a permissive counterclaim unless subject matter jurisdiction could be sustained
in the absence of the principal claim. A compulsory counterclaim is deemed ancillary to
the principal claim; a permissive counterclaim is not. See, e.g., Marks v. Spitz, 4 F.R.D.
348 (D. Mass. 1945) ; 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE f 13.15 (2d ed. 1948) ; cf. Moore v.
New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593 (1926); but see Green, Federal Jurisdiction
Over Counterclaims, 48 Nw. U.L. Rav. 271, 282-85 (1953) (arguing that permissive
counterclaims require no independent jurisdiction).
29. A survey of the cases reveals only one in which FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) was
applied to bar an omitted compulsory counterclaim in a situation in which the counter-
claim could be heard in no other way. And in that case the hardship affected but one
of a number of defendants. RFC v. First Nat'l Bank, 17 F.R.D. 397 (D. Wyo. 1955).
Several courts have barred omitted compulsory counterclaims when the claim could be
consolidated with other pending actions. E.g., Speed Products Co. v. Tinnerman Prod-
ucts Inc., 222 F.2d 61, 68 (2d Cir. 1955); E. J. Korvette Co. v. Parker Pen Co., 17
F.R.D. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Parker Rust Proof Co. v. Dextrex Corp., 14 F.R.D. 173
(S.D. Mich. 1953). See also Wright, supra note 17, at 432 (exhaustive search of de-
cisions under state compulsory counterclaim rules reveals only thirteen decisions barring
unpleaded claims).
30. See note 6 supra. The Court of Claims itself might not have considered the Gov-
ernment's claim a compulsory counterclaim even to the second Eastport action before it,
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Focusing on that original suit in another way, the Second Circuit might
also have ruled that the subject matter of the second Court of Claims action
was the original Eastport judgment, since the interest claim was only a con-
tinuation of Eastport's initial claim.31 Pursuing this analysis, a court would
hold the Government's action unrelated to the first Eastport judgment on the
ground that that judgment and the Government's admiralty claim involved
no substantial common issues.32 This approach would accord with the Court
of Claims' position that it could exercise jurisdiction over the interest claim
only because the claim grew out of its original judgment.33 The failure of the
circuit and district courts to adopt this or a similar rationale may perhaps
reflect dissatisfaction with the procedural intricacies which were exhausting
judicial energies and approaching the labyrinthine.
The Court of Claims might have nipped Eastport's procedural maneuvering
in the bud by accepting either of two arguments which that court chose to
reject at the time of litigation. Eastport's action on the initial judgment might
have been dismissed on the theory that the Court of Claims is without au-
thority to enforce its judgments against the United States. 4 Or, the setoff
statute could be read to preclude private actions on claims for interest 35 or
for the Government's claim in Eastport arose under the Merchant Ship Sales Act, 60
Stat. 41 (1946), 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1735-46 (1952), and was a separate statutory cause
of action. See Canned Foods, Inc. v. United States, 135 Ct. Cl. 862, 865, 146 F. Supp.
470, 472 (1956) (separate statutory cause of action compulsory in fact but not in law).
31. Compare 255 F.2d at 809 (dissenting opinion).
32. See notes 6, 7 supra; cf. Nachtman v. Crucible Steel Co. of America, 165 F.2d
997, 999 (3d Cir. 1948).
33. Eastport S.S. Co. v. United States, 131 Ct. Cl. 210, 212, 130 F. Supp. 333, 334
(1955); Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 135 Ct. Cl. 175, 178, 140 F. Supp. 773,
774 (1956).
34. See Hetfield v. United States, 78 Ct. Cl. 419 (1933); Yale & Towne Mfg. Co.
v. United States, 67 Ct. Cl. 618, 626 (1929); Foster, The General Accounting Office
and Government Claims (pt. 3), 16 J.B.A.D.C. 321, 324 (1949); 56 COLUm. L. REV.
274, 276-77 (1956) ; cf. District of Columbia v. Eslin, 183 U.S. 62 (1901) ; Pocono Pines
Assembly Hotels Co. v. United States, 73 Ct. Cl. 447, mandamus denied, 285 U.S. 526
(1932) (judgment "remanded" to the Court of Claims by act of Congress).
Execution is generally unavailable against the United States. See FHA v. Burr, 309
U.S. 242, 250 (1940) ; Buchanan v. Alexander, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 19 (1846) ; Citizen's
Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 863, 864 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1956) ; 3 MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTCE 13.31, at 84 (2d ed. 1948). Mandamus to force the Comptroller to
pay, as distinguished from mandamus to force him to sue as required by the setoff statute,
is an uncertain remedy. Compare Hines v. United States ex rel. Marsh, 105 F.2d 85,
93 (D.C. Cir. 1939), and National Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Warren, 82 F. Supp. 511, 514
(D.D.C. 1949), with Miguel v. McCarl, 291 U.S. 442 (1934). See also Developments
in the Lau--Rcnedies Against the United States and Its Offlcials, 70 HAuv. L. REv.
827, 846 (1957).
35. Interest claims have been heard when expressly authorized by statute. Girard
Trust Co. v. United States, 270 U.S. 163, 167 (1926); Chicago, I. & L. Ry. v. United
States, 78 Ct. Cl. 96 (1933). Contra, Stewart v. Barnes, 153 U.S. 456 (1894). But the
setoff statute has not been previously interpreted to authorize such claims prior to suit
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on Court of Claims judgments.36 The former reasoning is not without its
difficulties, however, inasmuch as the withholding could also have reached the
Court of Claims under the guise of an independent claim for interest.37 M1ore-
over, a blanket refusal to take jurisdiction would eliminate actions on judg-
ments as devices for bringing setoff disputes into the Court of Claims when
the United States is willing to accept that tribunal's decision. 38
The more satisfactory argument is that the setoff statute establishes an ex-
clusive procedure for judicial review of protested government withholdings
against judgment creditors. The statute directs the Comptroller "to cause legal
proceedings to be immediately commenced to enforce the . . . [Government's
claim] and to cause the same to be prosecuted to final judgment with all
reasonable dispatch," whenever a creditor presents a judgment for payment
and protests a withholding.3 9 The act thus suggests that initiative for suit lies
with the Government. 40 In this way, private parties are relieved of the ex-
pense of litigating setoffs in the Court of Claims, which may be far removed
from pertinent witnesses and records.41 To protect this privilege, judgment
creditors have successfully petitioned for writs of mandamus compelling the
United States to sue promptly,42 although mandamus is not expressly au-
thorized by the statute.43 The act's legislative background further supports
the position that its procedures should be exclusive. It was enacted in 1875
as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. O'Grady.
44
There, a private judgment creditor brought an action on a judgment to con-
test the authority of the central accounting officer of the United States to
withhold the amount of a government claim when paying a Court of Claims
judgment. The Supreme Court held that no such authority existed under the
by the United States. See United States v. Griswold, 30 Fed. 604, 606 (D. Ore. 1887)
(setoff statute confers no power on courts to anticipate its provisions) ; American Potash
Co. v. United States, 80 Ct. Cl. 160, 8 F. Supp. 717, 718 (1934); Stewart & Co. v.
United States, 71 Ct. Cl. 126, 131-32 (1930) (interest authorized only after withholding
proved wrongful); United States v. N.Y. Rayon Importing Co., 329 U.S. 654, 660-63
(1947) (dictum) (setoff statute interest payable only if Government fails to win its suit).
36. See text accompanying notes 39-45 infra.
37. See American Potash Co. v. United States, 80 Ct. Cl. 160, 8 F. Supp. 717
(1934); Stewart & Co. v. United States, 71 Ct. Cl. 126 (1930).
38. See, e.g., Stewart & Co. v. United States, supra note 37.
39. See note 2 supra.
40. See Richmond, F. & P.R.R. v. McCarl, 62 F.2d 203, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1932):
United States v. N.Y. Rayon Importing Co., 329 U.S. 654, 662 (1947) (dictum) ; East-
port S.S. Co. v. United States, 131 Ct. Cl. 210, 215, 130 F. Supp. 333, 335 (1955) (dis-
senting opinion) ; 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 13.31, at 83 (2d ed. 1948).
41. See id. 1 13.19, at 76.
42. E.g., Hines v. United States ex rel. Marsh, 105 F.2d 85, 93 (D.C. Cir. 1939):
National Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Warren, 82, F. Supp. 511, 514 (D.D.C. 1949). But see
Miguel v. McCarl, 291 U.S. 442 (1934) (Supreme Court reluctant to mandamus Comp-
troller).
43. See note 2 supra.
44. 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 641 (1874).
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then current statutory mandate that the central accounting officer "settle and
adjust" all government claims and debts.45 The setoff statute overruled
O'Grady and detailed requirements for suit by the United States. These re-
quirements would have been unnecessary had Congress intended to permit
creditors to test withholdings through suits on judgments in the Court of
Claims.
W'rhile not returning precisely to the status quo under O'Grady, Eastport,
by exposing the Government to litigation in unfavorable courts, does render
government withholding hazardous. A judgment creditor of the United States
need no longer await adjudication of a government claim, but may now allege
a wrongful withholding and bring suit for the withheld amount plus interest,
or for the interest alone, in the Court of Claims or in any district court open
to him. 46 This result may not be wholly undesirable, for it enables private
litigants to avoid the crowded dockets of some federal district courts and pre-
vent the needless prolongation of withholdings.47 On the other hand, a judg-
ment creditor may also use his greater maneuverability to force the United
States into a forum where precedent or practice is unfavorable. 48 In fact,
Eastport encourages forum shopping by demonstrating its advantages. 49 More-
over, if, as some cases suggest, a claim for interest can be litigated independ-
ently of the underlying, unsatisfied Court of Claims judgment,50 a government
creditor would commonly be able to sue in any district court having venue 51
and subject-matter jurisdiction, for only claims exceeding $10,000 must be
adjudicated by the Court of ClaimsY 2 After successfully pursuing his demand
45. Id. at 647.
46. See notes 51-52 infra.
47. The Southern District of New York, where many creditor corporations "reside,"
is especially crowded. See U.S. COURTS AD. OFFICE ANx. REF. at A-22 (1955) (45.9
month delay from filing to disposition, the longest in the country).
48. See note 13 supra.
49. Prior to the adoption of rule 17(a) in 1953, petitions for interest in the Court
of Claims would have been pointless, since the United States could not be precluded
from suing on its own cause of action in a district court. The Government could default
in the Court of Claims and could pay or not pay part or all of the resulting judgment
without fear of losing its counterclaim. This course is no longer available.
50. See Girard Trust Co. v. United States, 270 U.S. 163, 168 (1926) ; Chicago, I. &
L. Ry. v. United States, 78 Ct. Cl. 96 (1933).
51. Venue would ordinarily lie in any district where the plaintiff resides. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1402 (1952). For venue purposes, a corporation "resides" in any district in which it
is incorporated, licensed to do business, or doing business. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1952).
52. The district courts shall have original jurisdiction concurrent with the Court of
Claims, of: . . . Any other civil action or claim against the United States, not
exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of
Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or
implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages
in cases not sounding in tort ....
28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1952).
Under the treatment most favorable to the judgment creditor, courts might view the
interest claim as unique, unaffected either by the withheld government claim or by the
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for interest in a district court, a judgment creditor might then be able to rely
on the district court's decision as determinative of the merits of the Govern-
ment's claim.
5 3
The United States can protect itself against forum shopping by having the
Comptroller postpone final notification of his intention to withhold until the
Attorney General is prepared to institute suit. This practice would be waste-
ful, however, assuming as it does that every creditor will want to litigate
every withholding. Actually judgment creditors frequently assent to withhold-
ings or, when unalterably objecting, often await governmental action under
the setoff statute. 54 The inevitable delay attending a preliminary investigation
of all withholdings could cause a protesting judgment creditor unjust mone-
tary losses, for no interest is payable on an amount wrongfully withheld until
after the Government announces its determination to withhold.55 Worse, pay-
ment of the entire amount of a given judgment might be deferred for extended
periods while the Government investigated its most insignificant claims.
If the Government foregoes such dilatory tactics, Eastport's unique pro-
cedures and opportunities will remain available for fast-moving government
creditors. But if forum shopping can be minimized and the Government's
original judgment to which it -might be joined. Under the most restrictive approach,
courts might color the interest claim with the nature of the Government's withheld
claim, since they both raise the same issues of merit. Thus, if the government claim
were cognizable only in a court of special jurisdiction (an admiralty court in Eastport),
the interest claim would be dismissed if brought elsewhere. See 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1952) ;
Calmar S.S. Corp. v. United States, 345 U.S. 446, 455 (1953). Judgment creditors can,
as in Eastport, gain a middle ground by joining the interest claim with an an action
on the original judgment. Under these circumstances, as in Eastport. courts will appar-
ently base their subject matter jurisdiction on the judgment rather than the interest
claim. Of course, joinder of the original judgment with the interest claim will increase
the chances of stating a demand for more than $10,000.
53. If the Government defended the district court action on the merits of the with-
holding, a determination of that issue would be binding in subsequent actions. See RE-
STATEMENT, JUDG-MENTS § 45(c) (1942). But if the Government defaulted or confessed
judgment before actual litigation of the issue in the district court, "collateral estoppel"
would not apply. Id. § 68(2), comment i.
54. Interviews with Justice Department Officials, Nov. 1958.
55. To obtain payment of a judgment, the creditor must have secured a certificate
of settlement from the Comptroller General. See Foster, supra note 34, at 324. Issuance
of a certificate of partial settlement would constitute a withholding upon which the
creditor might base a claim for interest. In order to protect itself effectively, the United
States would, therefore, be obliged to delay issuance of even the partial certificate until
its suit was ready. The creditor can collect the balance of his judgment not withheld
and compute the interest due him on the withheld portion only after the issuance of the
certificate, which is final notice of the Government's intention to withhold over protest.
Therefore no interest would be paid for the period of the delay, even on tht portion of
the judgment not withheld. For example, in Eastport, though the judgment was presented
for payment on June 8, 1954, interest was paid only from September 29, 1954, the date
the certificate of settlement was issued, and then only on the withheld portion. Plaintiff's
Motion to Strike Defendant's Answer, Oct. 5, 1955.
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power to withhold preserved, Eastport's substitution of an interest claim for
a district court mandamus action may prove as much a blessing as a bane
because of the speedier procedures in the Court of Claims. To further the
policy of the setoff statute while accepting Eastport as precedent, future
courts might forbid judgment creditors to bring actions on Court of Claims
judgments or on interest claims for alleged wrongful withholdings unless the
Government is unable to sue or has delayed suit under the statute unneces-
sarily., The standard of unnecessary delay might be that previously applied
in setoff statute mandamus actions ;57 authority for this standard could be
derived from the statutory directive that the Comptroller sue "immediately."58
Those forum shopping opportunities then left to the judgment creditor would
simply serve to encourage expeditious suit by the United States. At the same
time, creditors could not exploit Eastport to frustrate the objective of the
setoff statute-to afford the United States an efficient means of collecting its
debts.
56. Compare Standard Dredging Co. v. United States, 71 Ct. Cl. 218 (1930) (con-
struing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1494, 2511 (Supp. II, 1955), and allowing a private party to litigate
a government claim against him after a three-year government delay).
57. See Hines v. United States ex rel. Marsh, 105 F.2d 85, 93 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
58. See note 2 supra.
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